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(3) there Is the obvious absence o! a code
or clear rUles o! International law or definition of legal disputes realistically protecting
us from judicial Interference with our foreign policy, upon which we depend for national security.
On the other hand, If the world peace
through law program Is reoriented to give
priority to the solution of these problems,
It may, as nations gradually gain confidence,
be helpful In the limited area where disputes are really subject to judicial solution.
However, any Implication that this alone
will bring peace Is a harmfUl delusion. Mani!estly, all history proves that most wars
are due to political disputes, which can
only be solved by agreements reached a!ter
the glve-and-ta.ke of d1plomatlc negotlatlon&-ln which judges woUld have no rules
and for which they have no quallftcatlons.
Let us hitch our wagon to the stars, but
not deceive ourselves by substituting slogans
for solutions--nor, as lawyers, omit relevant
facts and ignore alternative solutions In the
current debate on Connally.

OF LATIN

Mr. McGEE. Mr. President, I invite
the attention of my colleagues to a very
scholarly, enlightening, and forthright
article which appeared in the New York
Times magazine of December 4, 1960.
It was written by our distinguished majority leader, the senior Senator from
Montana [Mr. MANSFIELD], and is entitled "The Basic Problem of Latin
America."
In it the distinguished Senator suggests that we must start planning and
coordinating our oversea policies in regard to Latin America. He refers to
the "beachhead societies" along the
coasts of Latin America, and the wide
gap between those beachheads and the
poverty-stricken masses in the intetior.
It is his wise belief-and well should it
be observed by Members of the Congress--that our country, along with
Latin American countries, should integrate and coordinate their policies, if we
are to make our future position in Latin
America meaningful and truly helpful.
I ask unanimous consent that the
article be printed in the REcoRD.
There being no objection, the article
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
THE BASIC PROBLEM OF LATIN

AMERICA

(By Mn<E MANSFIELD)
When the new admlnlstratlon takes office
In January it wlil find the old problems or
Latin America stlll on the doorstep of the
White House. It wll! not be able to step over
or around these problems. It ls going to
have to face them frankly, decide promptly
What can be done about them and begin in
earnest to act on them.
As a nation, we have reawakened to our
stake ln the Western Hemisphere and certain
recent actions of Congress refiect this reawakening. We have, for example, expanded
the lending facllltles of our Export-Import
Bank and joined ln the creation of the InterAmerican Development Bank. Most recently,
Congress proposed a broad new approach to
the Inter-American problems ln authorizing
$500 ml!llon to begin a new ald program.
And Under Secretary Dlllon followed
through at the inter-American economic
meeting at Bogota, Colombia, with a pledge
of U.S. cooperation In dealing with Latin
America's economic and social problems.

In short, the legal means for a new approach to Latin America have been accumulated. Their etrectlve use awaits the
touch of alert and sensitive leadership from
the new admlnlstratlon.
The Importance of that kind of leadership ln Inter-American atralrs cannot be
overemphasized. Unless It Is present, there
Is a danger that we shall Interpret the
Latin American situation prlmarlly In terms
of Castrolsm and communism. If we do so,
the basic problem will elude us. To be
sure, Castroism and communism are powerful forces, but they are In the nature of an
elfect rather than a cause. Underlying their
presence on the stage ln Cuba and In the
wings elsewhere In Latin America Is a more
fundamental factor.
In plainest terms, the basic problem of
Latin America Is that the social structures
of ltlany nations of the region are seriously
out of date and cannot endure ln their present form ln the second hal! of the 2oth
century. They cannot endure for the simple
reason that they do not deliver enough education, enough food, shelter and clothing,
enough medical aid, enough of the conveniences that are taken for granted ln this
country and are relatively commonplace ln
Western Europe and even ln Soviet Russia.
Most Important, they do not provide for a
sufficient number of people that lntangllble
but essential element of prideful participation In the present and hope for the future
which ls the keynote of political stab1llty.
The lnablllty of many Latin American nations to meet the needs of their people arises
not so much from underdevelopment as
from extremely lopsided development. In
Peru, for example, during a plane fl1ght of
2 hours one can travel to places that dllfer
In development by several centuries.
That Is the extent o! the lag between
the capital of Lima with Its wide boUlevards, plazas, skyscrapers, modern convenIences and traffic problems and the quiet,
wretchedly poor vlllages In the Andean
highlands to the east, Inhabited by llllterate
Indians who scratch out a bare existence
using primitive agricultural methods. FlyIng 2 hours further to the east, the plane
sets down In an isolated clearing In the
Amazonian jungle stalked by trlbespeople
who stlll hunt with polson-tipped darts.
Here the soclsl lag Is measured ln mlllennla.
In Lima Itself, a !Iterate and cultured
minority llve surrounded by a vast urban
poor whose lot Is one o! unspeakable squalor.
The poor know what decent housing ls but
they do not have lt. They know that modern medical care can cure but they are not
cured. They know that education Is beneficial but they are not educated. In short,
the decencies of modern life are clearly visIble to them and, just as clearly, beyond
their reach.
Peru ls not unique. Lopsided development Is to be found In greater or lesser degree In just about every nation In Latin
America. It Is a consequence of the unique
complex of cUltural and economic forces that
has shaped these societies over the centuries.
The modern Latin American nations began
as beachheads In the New World In much the
same way as dld our original 13 States. Unllke this Nation, however, the social structure of most of our southern neighbors more
or less atrophied In this form.
The European-derived mlnorltles In the
cities provided the economic organization
necessary for a limited tapping of the great
natural wealth of the interiors, which was
funneled abroad largely In the form of exports of food and raw materials. The returns
from these exports were hoarded or spent
abroad or were stopped largely at the beachhead cities. This process underlles the great
concentration of wealth ln a few hands and
the spectacular growth of some Latin AmerIcan cities Into Islands of lush modernism
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and great cUlture In a sea of social stagnation.
For the many Latin Americans In the city
slums and particUlarly In the hinterlands,
the process has had llttle constructive relevance. Through generations they have continued to llve out their llves In ancient Indian and tribal patterns. Or lf they have
been drawn Into the process, it has been to
provide the labor to grow, to extract and to
move commodities to the beachheads. They
have received few benefits In the form of
sufficient food, better health, greater comforts and opportunities for self-development. 41
Not only ln an economic sense have most
of the people of Latin America been bystanders, or mere cogs, in the beachhead societies. They were also bypassed for a long
time by the concepts of responsible government and freedom when these ideas Invaded
Latin America In the 19th century.
These new clarions did not reach much
beyond the beachheads and they were heard
almost exclusively by the small minorities.
The balance of the popUlace was summoned
by them, If at all, only at moments of qUixotic ftareup which changed rulers without
brlngtng about changes In the basic structure or Latin American society.
The pressure for deep change In this structure, however, has been accumUlating steadUy for several decades, notably since World
War II. It Is fed from intricate sources but
certainly it Is due for the major part to the
stagnation of agricUlture under antiquated
systems of production and exploitative systems of land tenure at a time of rapidly
expancUng popUlation.
It Is fed, too, by the beginnings of an lndustrlallzatlon that has Intensified urban
concentration and brought more and more
poople Into a direct awareness of the inadequacy of their lot In contrast to the glaring
wealth and opportunities of a few.
Perhaps most of all, the accumulating
pressure for deep-seated change Is a consequence of modern communications. Ideas
no longer stop at the beachheads. The slum
dwellers of the Latin-American cltles and the
poverty-stricken vlllagers of the hinterlands
alike have heard the message from this
country, from Europe, and from Soviet
Russia.
Mlil!ons of Latin Americans are now persuaded that a stole sutrerlng of misery or
repression Is not a virtue. The more that
this concept is disseminated and takes root,
the more the pressure for change lntenslftes
and along with It the search for leaders
capable of bringing about such change.
Responsible Latin-American statesmen
know that the long-range problem confrontIng their countries Is to convert the beachhead societies Into stable national structures.
But the lmmedltae problem Is to cut the
social lags which exist between the cities and
the hinterlands, between the a11luent minorIties and the poor in the cities themselves.
For, because of these lags, the pitch of the
demagog more often than not Is able ·to
rise above the voice of reason, and the tangible promises of repress! ve Ideologies tend to
swamp the abstractions of freedom.
An adequate solution to the Immediate
problem of social lag Is essential if durable
progress Is to be made on the long-range
problem of developing responsible, stable
governments ln Latin America.
The key to the solution is an Indigenous
leadership which has the courage to risk
shifting substantially the base of political
support from the entrenched and powertul
few to the many. Even If the shift is made,
the leadership must stU! have the wisdom
and restrain to use this broadened polltlcal
power not for a new entrenchment of personal power but for the bUilding of Institutions of freedom and progress.
That kind of leadership has not been
conspicuous In Latin America untl! com-
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more than one judge." Can anyone really
doubt how any judges nominated by dictators like Castro, Nasser, Trujillo, Sukarno,
Nkrumah and Toure and many others,
whether Communist or not, will vote on Issues which their bosses deem vital to their
own nations?
The election of judges Is by concurrent
action of the General Assembly and the Security Council. The 11-member Security
Council already has one permanent Communist member, and when the neutralists led
by Nehru (and also many western nations)
have their way with the admission of Red
China, there will be two permanent Communist members. But In addition to that,
the majority of the Security Council (six)
are elected by the General Assembly biannually-which thus has the ultimate control of the composition of the Security
Council. The United States has but one vote
out of 99 (the present membership of the
General Assembly). By contrast, the African
bloc alone has a vote of 26.17 Yet It Is not
merely those who openly cooperate with the
Soviets, like Nkrumah, but Nehru, who Is
currently reported as saying the United Nations Charter Is "weighted too much In favor
of Europe and the Americas at the expense
of Asia and Africa." 18
We are not concerned with diplomatic reasons for the tremendous changes now going
on, or with the future of the United Nations,
but solely with the obvious fact that the
electoral machinery for World Court judges
plainly Invites political maneuvering. It
should be manifest to all that as the present
six vacancies are filled and as a third of the
Court Is triennially renewed, the World
Court will Include not only two Communist
judges as at present, but more and more
judges, whether coming from Communist or
other monolithic states, who will regard
themselves as agents of their respective
states with no tradition of an Independent
judiciary. If we are Interested In nonpolitical and unbiased judges, Is not such
political jockeying and maneuvering In the
changing General Assembly (and Indirectly
In the Security Council) and the future per'' Senate Hearings 45, 61.
"Changes In the Security Council will Inevitably follow. It Is widely conceded that
the close vote this year Indicates Red China
will be admitted next year. When the remaining 19 African colonies are freed and
admitted to the U.N., the African bloc, 85
percent Illiterate and largely uncivilized,
with but a slightly larger population, will
have 45 times the voting power of the United
States. The United States' voting power will
be further diluted on the admission of 18
more Asiatic nations.
18 The Nehru statement was reported In the
Baltimore Sun, October 4, 1960; the population figures are reported In various pu bllcatlons--see, for example, U.S. News, October
3, 1960; and the shifting power has been
widely commented upon--see, for example,
U.S. News, August 22, 1960; New York Times,
September 18, 25 and October 2, 1960. The
reductio ad absurdum Is that 31 of the present member states are not as large as a single
average state of the United States, like
Maryland, and yet have 31 times the voting
of the entire United States. Indeed, there
are a number of them not as large as a single
Maryland county. Moreover, what has happened to the basic reform project of weighted
representation, advocated long before the
United States' voting strength based on
numbers alone had dropped to Its 1 percent
present level of absurdity-e.g., Rhyne, supra,
note 14. Khrushchev Is reported widely to
be trying to rule or ruin the U.N. Itself.
But, Irrespective of ultimate or present success In such efforts, nobody can believe that
Communist judges on a World Court will
block their master's wishes on issues their
bosses deem vital.

sonnet of the World Court Infinitely more
Important than the past voting recorda of
prior judges (so stressed by proponents),
which largely reflect (a) their selection by a
smaller number of more advanced nations
before the cold war became so hot, and (b)
decisions in cases which have not involved
matters of the magnitude which could lead
to peace or war, or which Involved national
security?
The present argument Is not whether
biased judges will constitute a majority of
the Court. No lawyer wants even a few
biased judges. Decisions often turn on a
few votes. For example, there were 5 dissents and 1 partial dissent out of 14 judges
sitting In the World Court In the Corfu case
(Senate hearings, 360). There were divided
opinions In 75 percent of the cases heard
In the last term of our own Supreme Court,
Including a 5-to-4 division In a matte!' Involving Federal supremacy over the States.
It can hardly be doubted how the admittedly Communist judges would act in cases
that might Involve, for example, CUba and
Panama. But would not judges from the
Arable countries, In view of the recent cancellation of the canal lease, be likewise
biased? So that matter, how would judges
from the South American bloc react? Or on
questions of confiscation and expropriation
of property In Cuba or elsewhere, how would
judges from countries which have recently
Indulged In the same practice free themselves of their national Interest? Our Guantanamo Naval Base, under perpetual lease
from Cuba (obtained after we had freed
Cuba from Spain), Is concededly the keystone of our Caribbean defense. Castro currently threatens to have our rights determined by "international law." Are we really
willing to delegate its disposal, which may
Involve our national survival, to such a
court? 19
If the Issues Involved are minor legal disputes not really Involving fundamental Issues, then we must realize and accept the
view that a program of world peace through
law must be much more gradual than Its
proponents suggest. If, on the other hand,
the World Court Is really to decide Issues
involving International disputes of a magnitude which may lead to war, then we must
be prepared to transfer from our elected
representatives to a World Court decisions
Involving fundamental national foreign
pol!cy and our national security. If the
latter, few judges on a World Court will find
It humanly possible to divorce themselves
from their overriding Interest In and their
loyalty to, their own country and Its allies.
Are there then any rules llrnlting the jurisdiction of the World Court and defining the
law It would administer?
VAGUENESS OF JUSTICIABLE DISPUTES AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

Bar a&Soclatlons spend much effort In
making domestic law more certain and .predictable through codification, uniform
statutes, restatement of the law, etc. Courts
demand precision of statute as a protection
to defendants In the criminal courts. Where
Is the precision In the international law
which nobody has attempted to codify? Yet,
certainty Is of transcendant Importance to
whole nations if the program of "world peace
through law" !s to resolve Issues which may
really Involve peace or war. Do we find any
real guide for judges from 15 nations !n the
loose language of article 38 of the statute?
1. International custom as evidence of a
general practice accepted as law? Surely
customs have varied widely between nations
and have been both accepted and rejected
at various times, so that there !s l!ttle area
where agreement !s general. Or In
2. Principles of law recognized by civilized
nations-Moslem? Asian? South American?
"See Hanson Baldwin, Saturday Evening
Post, Sept. 24, 1960.

African? Is Cuba c!vll!zed after 60 years of
Independence, or Congo after 90 days? But
can the World Court say members of the
United Nations are not even civilized? :o
Or !n
3. Publicists' teachings. There will be
much difference of opinion on who are authoritative publicists and, as pointed out
above, !t Is conceded that the area of International law Is Increasing.
Nor could decisions of the World Court
have much effect as precedents (statute, art.
59). Surely, It Is Infinitely more Important
In this realm of conflicting Ideologies, legal
systems, opposing rules of publlclsts, than
in the field of relatively uniform domestic
law to codify, or at least define, the rules In
advance. Lack of certainty was but recently
st ated to be the basic cause of the widespread distrust and disuse of the World
Court.""
Then again, there Is no clear rule on what
Is justiciable and what Is political. This
goes to the heart of the matter and Is not
solved by restriction to legal disputes. The
claim " that matters so poll tlcally lmportan t
as the Berlin and Suez crises could be materially affected by judicial decisions seems
Incredible. Does anyone actually believe
that significant parts of these Issues will be
left to a court to decide In the light of current history? Or the Cuban crisis, where
(absent a political solution by the Organization of American States) the President has
Indicated the (unilateral) Monroe Doctrine
will be Invoked If necessary to hemisphere
defense and our national safety?
It Is now argued by proponents that a
World Court would be helpful to the collection of financial claims. Aside from the
legal problem posed by the limitation of
access to the World Court to only nations
as parties, under Article 34(1) of the statute,
there Is no substantial record of Its successful use for this purpose In the past, and certainty of law In this limited area Is just as
essential for a World Court as for a domestic court.
CONCLUSION

The cold war since 1946 has demonstrated
the Imperative need for caution In unilateral
judicial disarmament.
It Is submitted
therefore that this Is not the time to repeal
the Connally amendment because (1) It
would weaken our position vis-a-vis, not
only Communist nations but substantially
all great powers, unless we substitute some
of their non-Connally type safety conditions
or reservations; " (2) the World Court will
Inevitably Include more and more Commun!st and political judges as the relative
voting power of the more advanced Western
nations continues to decline through the admission of numerous little primitive states;
•• Yet neither Communist nations nor many
of the new members are "civilized" under orthodox definitions--e.g., 1 Oppenheim, "International Law" 1905, p. 31; Hall, "International Law" 1909, p. 39.
"E.g., Rhyne, supra, note 14.
,, See World Peace Through Law Commit tee Report, page 24.
"' Such as (a) the right to withdraw at
will, like most of the great powers, or (b) a
clearer national security reservation, which
was the obvious Intent of the Connally Reservation and which is Inherent In a conception of national sovereignty. It should be
noted that such reservations are much
broader than the Connally-type reservation,
since they plainly would cover political disputes as well as legal disputes. (c) Professor Sohn (46 A.B.A.J. 25) called sixteen reservations major without counting the right
to withdraw at will, and suggested alternatives to outright repeal. These also should
be studied Instead of being blandly Ignored
as they are by the leaders In the repeal
movement.
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pa.rat!vely recent times. But It is beginning, now, to appear with Increasing frequency. Wherever It has appeared, as In
Venezuela and Peru, to cite just two examples, Its hold Is st!ll most tenuous. The old
centers of power contract slowly and the
social lags still breed demagogs.
Yet, In spite or these obstacles, the transition from beachhead to modern states
must go forward. If It is not led by those
who believe In freedom, it will surely be
pushed by those who do not. Specifically,
any Latin American nation which tackles
this problem must move on several fronts
simultaneously:
1. It must act, at once, to alleviate the
most glaring Inadequacies in diet, housing,
and health from which tens of millions of
people suJfer.
2. It must Improve agriculture by diversifying crops. broadening land ownership, expanding cultivable acreage, and introducing
modern agricultural techniques on a wide
scale In order to increase production, particularly of food.
3. It must bring about the establishment
or a steadily expanding range of industries.
4. It must wipe out Illiteracy within a few
years and provide adequate facUlties to educate an ever-increasing number of highly
trained technicians, specialists, and professionals to provide the whole range of modern
services.
5. It must end the relative !solation of the
beachheads from the Interiors and the parts
of the 1n terlor from one another by a vast
enlargement or existing systems of transportation and communications.
Effective free government in Latin America can achieve much of what needs to be
done by marshaling the unused or partially
used labor potential and capital or its own
people. It can act to transfer initiative,
energies, and resources from Paris and
Monte Carlo, so to speak, to Arequipa and
Tucuman.
But even if these sources have been tapped, the total capacity for doing what must
be done IS likely to fall short of the job.
It is precisely at this point that recognition
of our long-range national Interest, and acceptance of the responsibillties of leadership
in this hemisphere, can be decisive.
In the past our economic pollcies respecting Latin America have not been focused on
the problem of the beachhead nature of its
societies. We have dabbed at the Inner difficulties of the Latin American nations with
small point 4 programs and In other random ways. These have helped-but 1n a
most llmited fashion.
The emphasis of our pollcles has been on
encouraging the ftow of private U.S.
investment. This approach has had the
effect of reinforcing the beachheads
rather than modifying them. For the most
part, the products and returns ·of this enterprise ftow abroad or are held in the beachhead cities. Only a relative handful of
Latin-Americans have benefited.
I! we aim our policies at the problem of
the transition from the beachheads, It should
be readily apparent that our agricultural
surpluses will have great relevance to the
Immediate problem of massive malnutrition
In Latin America. There Is great relevance,
too, In the capacities of the Export-Import
Bank and the Inter-American Development
Bank and other sources to the expansion or
transportation and communications facilIties. Finally, the new aid program authorized by Congress can be poln ted directly
at the enormous needs In housing, health
and education.
Aid from the United States w!ll not help
to end the beachheads If It continues to be
applied haphazardly. It wU! be effective
only If It moves in coordinated channels
toward specific, measurable goals of social
and economic development In Latin
America.

To bring about such a ftow we must first
centralize control over the various aid
sources within our own Government. Second, we must Insist that the Latin-American
leaders plan and act with us to use aid In
combination with the energies and resources
of their respective countries to bulld sinews,
rather than symbols, of modern progress.
Unless we accept for ourselves, and are
able through leadership and diplomacy to
get recipient countries to accept, the idea
of an Integrated approach for all fUture aid
activities, development in the Americas is
not likely to be brought about under the
aegis of freedom. A new and larger sprinkling of aid In the old random pattern will
produce little growth. Better prices and a
larger market for coffee, sugar or whatever
may act as tranqu!llzers but they wlll not
cure the 111.
As a nation, we have got to face up to that
fact. So, too, must the Latin-Americans.
That Is the challenge to the new administration. It Is a challenge to rid our LatinAmerican policies of sterile slogans and
shibboleths which have heretofore obscured
the problems. It Is a challenge to supply the
national and hemispheric leadership and the
administrative followthrough that will use
existing resources In a concentrated program
to enlarge the beachhead societies of Latin
America Into truly national, democratic
states.
The success of that effort Is essential to
Latin America's future. It is essential to
the future of this Nation.

RELEASE OF TWO AMERICAN FLIERS
BY RUSSIA
Mr. FONG. Mr. President, last week
the Soviet Union made a grandstand
play by releasing two American fliers
Russia had held illegally since last July,
when, in a plain act of piracy on the
high seas, the Communists shot down a
U.S. RB-47 reconnaissance bomber over
international waters.
Certainly we all rejoice for the men
and their families who had been so
cruelly and so unnecessarily separated
by the Communist pirates.
At the same time, we should not delude ourselves that the cold war is now
thawing. This was no act of humanitarianism on the part of the Communists.
It was a transparent propaganda move
to score a palpable hit with the rest of
the world. Undoubtedly, Mr. Khrushchev hopes we will interpret his action
as an indication of Soviet willingness to
make concessions in the interest of relieving tensions between the two great
powers.
As the Washington Post and Times
Herald pointed out in an excellent editorial last Friday:
It Is no more a concession than the agreement of a recalcitrant child, In expectation
of reward, to stop throwing stones or breakIng up the furniture.

What reward-or ransom-President
Kennedy paid to Mr. Khrushchev for the
release of our two fliers held hostage
by the Russians has not yet been revealed to the American people. I sincerely hope our new administration has
not begun a policy of appeasement as
part of its self-styled "quiet diplomacy."
For, if the administration paid a big
price to obtain release of 2 Americans,
Mr. Khrushchev will demand an even
bigger price to reveal the fate of 11 other
Americans whose unarmed transport was

shot down by Soviet fighter planes in
September 1958. According to a Soviet
magazine recently published, the 11
United States airmen parachuted to
safety and were promptly imprisoned
by the Soviets. The same magazine has
just retracted this statement, but doubt
persists.
If Mr. Khrushchev truly desires to
ease cold war tensions, let him come
clean about this incident. If he does
not, then we can only assume that he
intends to use his captives as political
pawns in the cold war, j\lst as he has
done in the past.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the REcoRD at
this point three analytical statements
on these questions: the Post editorial,
an article by David Lawrence In the
Washington Evening Star of January 27,
and an article by Roscoe Drummond in
the Post of January 28.
There being no objection, the editorial
and articles were ordered to be printed
in the RECORD as follows:
[From the Washington Post, Jan. 27, 1961]
CHEERS FOR WHAT?

All Americans w111 rejoice that the two
surviving RB-47 filers have been released
from their priSon in the Soviet Union. Unquestionably this move does, as President
Kennedy remarked, remove a serious obstacle
to peaceful relations between the United
States and the Soviet Union. But before
there are too many handsprings, It is useful
to analyze what the Soviet Union has really
done.
The RB-47 Incident was not at all In the
category of the U-2 flights over the Soviet
Union, which Mr. Kennedy has wisely ordered not be resumed. In those overflights
the United States was legally the offender.
The RB-47 was shot down by Soviet planes
over International waters, and the a.!Ialr was
misrepresented by the Soviet Union 1n an
obvious attempt to embarrass the United
States at the time.
What, then, does the release signify? It
merely permits the Soviet Union to purge
itself in some degree of an action which was
lllegal In the first place and which cost the
llves of four other Americans. This. could
have been done at any time during the last
6 months in response to the entreaties of
President Eisenhower. The Soviet Government delayed the step In a transparent effort
to Ingratiate Itself with the Kennedy administration with the appearance of a concession.
The release Is to be welcomed on Its own
account, and there wlll be hopes that It w111
pave the way for some ~ort of mutual Interest negotiation. But the mere cessation of
outrageous behavior makes Mr. Khrushchev
not one whit le•s an implacable adversary.
It Is no more a concession than the agreement of a recalltrant child, in expectation
of reward, to stop throwing stones or breakIng up the furniture.
WHAT ABOUT THE 0THERS?-FATE OF
UNEXPLAINED

il

FLIERS

(By Roscoe Drummond)
There is every reason to welcome the action of the Soviet Union in freeing the two
U.S. filers whose plane, the RB-47, the Russians shot down over the International waters of the Barents Sea last July.
But It would be an egregious mistake to
construe tb.ls gesture as In Itself easing any
of the significant tensions of the cold war
or as offering evidence that the Soviets
want to negotiate productively with President Kennedy.
Mr. Kennedy is making it clear that he
does not Intend to be drawn Into premature,
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unprepared summit talks. To him, this
means proof that there Is some basis tor a.
meeting or minds.
To free two American fliers who should
never have been detained and whose plane
should never have been shot down (since It
was not over Soviet terri tory) Is no evidence
whatsoever that Mr. Khrushchev wants to
settle anything with Mr. Kennedy except on
Soviet terms.
It may be evidence that Mr. Khrushchev
wants to build a. little good will before approaching the new administration on a.ny
score. As such It should be accepted for
exactly what It Is-a. rectification of something which was wrong In the first place.
What about the 11 Americans who had
not been heard !rom since their unarmed
U.S. transport plane, which lost Its bearing
a. few miles over the Soviet-Turkish frontier
In September, 1958, was shot down by Soviet fighter planes?
At that time the Soviets turned over the
bodies of six dead U.S. airmen and blandly
assured us that they had not seen, had no
knowledge of, and had done nothing to the
other members of the crew.
The news, which has now come out vla
East Germany and was teprlnted perhars
accidentally by a Soviet m~azlne, Is that
the Soviets captured the 11 filers after they
ha.d parachuted to safety and Immediately
imprisoned them. There Is still no word
from them or about them: Mr. Khrushchev
says he doesn't believe the Soviet mag!izlr.e.
You will recall that shortly after this Incident Soviet Deputy Premier Anastas Mlkoyan was visiting Washington In the Interests
of trade and good will. I recounted something of the behavior In this report a.t the
time:
Mr. Mlkoyan put on a. heavy act of Injured
innocence when the President, the VIce
President, Secretary Dulles, ·and members of
the Senate Foreign Relations Co=lttee kept
asking him about what happened to the 17man crew o! the American plane.
Mr. Mlkoyan pulled out all the stops. He
was pained; he was hurt; he was mystified;
he was excruciatingly baflled by the picky
questions which the Americans oddly Insisted upon putting to him. He held up his
hands In a grand gesture of puzzlement to
Mr. Nixon and exclaimed: "Why should we
hide anything? Why are Americans so suspicious about this?"
Finally, In hls Interview with Secretary
Dulles he made as though he could stand It
no longer and professed to be downright
Irritated because the officials o! the United
States did not seem to accept his personal
and official assurances that the American
transport had not been shot down, that It
ha.d crashed o! Its own fault and that
(beyond the 6 bodies of the 17-man crew)
the Soviets had told all-absolutely.
We still do not have the answer to Mr.
Mlkoyan's rhetorical question: "Why should
we hide anything?" but we do have the answer to his other question: "Why are Americans so suspicious?"
We are suspicious because the whole Soviet
explanation was fishy on Its face and the
denials have now been found to be untrue.
The Soviet magazine, In reprinting an article
from an East German Communist publication, discloses that the 11 unreported U.S.
filers were detained by the Soviets and have
been held lnco=unlcado ever since. This,
despite repeated Soviet statements that they
had not round them.
It should not be overlooked that the
Soviets took the case of the two U 13. RB-47
filers, now released, to the U.N. Security
Council, demanding that the U.N. condemn
the United States for violating International
law. When the Security Council suggested
the facts be Investigated, Russia vetoed this
proposal. Preposterous Idea, Investigating
the !acts. Now that the two RB-47 filers
have been freed, what about the other 11?

Or does Moscow want to hold them back to

build more good will?
[From the Washington Star, Jan. 27, 1961)
U.S. PRICE FOR RELEASED FLIEBS-PRESIDENT'S
STATEMENT ON SoVIET ACTION VIEWED AS
LEAVING SOME QUESTIONS
(By David Lawrence)
What ransom price did the U.S. Government pay the Soviet Government to elfect
the release of the two flyers from the RB-47
who were kidnapped on the high seas and
held for 7 months without being permitted
to co=unlcate with their own Government? Did this country make any concessions to the Soviets, and, I! so, just what
were they? Some Senators are asking these
questions.
As one studies the transcript o! President
Kennedy's first news conference, It Is apparent that the administration here has not
given to the American people the whole
story of just what happened In the exchanges o! messages between Moscow and
Washington In the last few days.
One of the newsmen asked this question:
"Mr. President, can you tell us something
about what your role was, I! you had one,
In the release of these fliers? Did this come
about as a consequence o! some action you
took?"
Mr. Kennedy did not answer the question.
He simply said that "this matter has been
under discussion" by the American Ambassador In Moscow and Soviet authorities.
The reporters were not satisfied with this
avoidance of the Issue and asked the President this question:
"In consequence of Mr. Khrushchev's apparent Indication last week o! a willingness
to release the American flyers, have you sent
any co=unlca.tlon to him through Ambassador Thompson or otherwise?"
Mr. Kennedy's answer was: "We have had
several exchanges with the Soviet authorities.
I do not believe that one has taken place
since the release o! the prisoners."
Later In the news conference, there was
a. further colloquy on this subject:
Question: "Did the Russians ask any quid
pro quo or did we make any concessions to
them In exchange !or the release o! these
filers? I! not, how do you account tor this
remarkable turnabout In their relations with
us?"
Answer: "The statement which I have
made Is a. statement which the U.S. Government put forward on this matter, which I
read to you earlier In regard to overflights.
I would not attempt to make a. judgment all
to why the Soviet Union chose to release
them at this time. I did sa.y In my statement to Mr. Arrowsmith (earlier In the press
conference) that this had removed a. serious
obstacle In the way of peaceful relations between the Soviet Union and the United
States, and I would judge that they desire
to remove that serious obstacle."
Question: "Does that mean, sir, that they
accepted a reassurance of no more overflights as an exchange?"
Answer: "It 1s a. fact that I have ordered
that the flights not be resumed, which Is a
continuation of the order given by President Eisenhower In May of last year."
This leaves unanswered exactly how and
why and when the pledge was gl ven to the
Soviet Union that no more U-2 overflights
would be authorized.
For one thing, Mr. Kennedy made It clear
a.t the news conference that the shooting
down of the RB-47 was In an entirely different category !rom the U-2 Incident. Actually, the RB-47's flyers were forced down
over the open seas, where they had a right to
be. I! there was no connetclon between the
U-2 flights and the RB-47 Incident, the question naturally arises as to why Mr. Kennedy
felt It necessary to announce that during the
discussions with the Soviet Union on the
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release o! the RB-4 7 flyers assurances had
been given that the U-2 flights would not be
resumed.
The Inference Is clear that, whether the
commitment not to resume U-2 flights was
given In a. conversation at Moscow by Ambassador Thompson during the last few days
separate from the one about the RB-47 flyers,
the Soviets themselves took the two to be
related a.nd based their action on It.
In other words, the Soviets wanted to appear before the world as having achieved a
diplomatic victory, and so they Insisted upon
some assurance concerning the overflights.
When this was given, the Soviets o! their
own Initiative decided to release the flyers.
It may well be argued whether the United
States was party to a. "deal" but the plain
facts are that, simultaneously with the release of the RB-47 flyers, a co=ltment was
announced by President Kennedy that there
would be no more U-2 overflights.
This Is In some respects a disappointing
turn of events. The United States has a.
right to fly far above the ground and tho
Soviet Union Insists upon the same right
when It sends satellites around the globe
that take photographs from high altitudesa. form of observation for military purposes.
There Is no pledge as yet, moreover, that
the Soviet Union will stop Its espionage here
In the United States or Infiltration 1n other
parts of the world, particularly Cuba., where
It Is openly assisting a. government that Is
hostile to the United States.
Mr. Kennedy struggled through the press
conference without making a definite statement as to how much the United States conceded to get the release o! flyers whom the
Soviets, o! course, had no rlgh t to force down
In the first place.

DEDICATION OF NORTH MIAMI
BEACH OSTEOPATHIC GENERAL
HOSPITAL, MIAMI, FLA.
Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent to insert In the REcORD a speech which I gave in Miami, Fla.,
November 20, 1960. The speech was delivered at a banquet held for fund-raising
purposes for the proposed Osteopathic
General Hospital of North Miami Beach,
Fla.
There being no objection, the speech
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
SPEECH OF THE HONORABLE WAYNE MORSE,
U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF OREGON,
NOVEMBER 20, 1960, MIAMI, FLA.
Ladles a.nd gentlemen, we have gathered
together tonight not only to dedicate the
financial drive !or a. wonderful North Miami
Beach Osteopathic Genera.! Hospital to Its
noble purposes, but also to rededicate ourselves to the moral obligation o! promoting
man's humanity to man. The privilege and
trust Inherent In your Invitation to participate with you In this dedication ceremony
moves me very deeply.
As the offices o! the American Osteopathic
Association well know, during my 16 years In
the Senate I have always supported a.nd will
continue to support equality of consideration
for members o! the osteopathic school of
medicine In any medical hospital or medical
research program In which the Federal Government may play a. part.
This proposed hospital In a very real sense
will be both a. physical monument to, a.nd a.n
Inspiring symbol of the self-sacrifices o! the
many men and women both In a.nd out o!
the osteopathic profession who will make
this haven o! mercy and medical care a.
reality. As the American Osteopathic Association has stated, "Your osteopathic hospital Is more than bricks and stainless steel,
more than costly equipment and specially

